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 Jacques Maritain, the Catholic philosopher and publicist, was the highest 
profile thinker to defend the concept of human rights in the immediate postwar 
period, the era of their framing in the Universal Declaration and embedding in 
European identity. What I would like to analyze in this essay is how this once 
reactionary critic of rights transformed into their champion. The basic argument 
is that this shift has to be correlated with overall ideological change in 
Catholicism, in which dominant old political options disappeared and new ones 
were needed. They were created, not simply adopted from elsewhere: Maritain – 
who castigated the language of rights through the late 1930s – changed them 
through his turn to them as much as they changed him. And his personalist and 
communitarian recasting of the language as a new option for Christianity helps 
explain why commitments to human dignity and human rights could become as 
prominent as they did in the postwar European order. 
 For we must give up once and for all the idea that the history of human 
rights is a story in which a static liberal doctrine rises slowly over time, its degree 
of external acceptance (and the failure of external alternatives to it) the main 
story unconnected to any sense of its internal plasticity and ideological 
reinvention.1 In a recent book, Jay Winter has proposed that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights be seen as a “utopia,” albeit in a minor key.2 If so, 
what matters is whose utopia it was, and with what content, at the moment of its 
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formulation and at different stages of its reception. I will try to argue that, in 
terms of the cultural meanings that the concept had in the beginning, human 
rights reflected most centrally the ideology of “personalist humanism.” 
This ideology, the intellectual backbone of the larger postwar European 
politics of human dignity, not only cannot be left out when pondering the 
original meaning of human rights, but was arguably their most determining 
constituent. On reflection, other proposals for understanding the content and 
ambiance of human rights in this inaugural era are not all that plausible. The 
Universal Declaration was certainly not a revolutionary document, in continuity 
with the revolutionary ideology of rights of the early modern period, even 
though it made a place for some of its long since domesticated content. The years 
of immediate postwar European history were also not a “republican moment.” 
Finally, though the Universal Declaration is as much backward looking as 
forward looking, the people who understood human rights as a response to the 
Holocaust specifically were few and far between. And, if there were such things 
as human rights, there was no  “human rights movement” motivated to 
collective action by other grievous catastrophes or various structural wrongs. 
Conversely, the ideology of personalist humanism, associated with the 
spiritualist and communitarian search for a third-way alternative to the rival 
materialisms of individualist liberalism and totalitarian communism, fits quite 
well with the main political drift of the moment in European society. When one 
considers the postwar years as the period of stabilization and reconstruction that 
they were – an era of the conservative “re-recasting” of bourgeois Europe, if I 
may put it that way – then whole postwar politics of human dignity looks like its 
ideological translation, with its emphasis on the restoration of fundamental 
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values, often thought to be religious in basis, and its resumption of the hallowed 
moral truths of “Western civilization.” Postwar human rights fit best in this 
context. They originated not just due to an American “new deal for the world,” 
but also as part of the reinvention under pressure of a self-styled European 
humanism.3 If this isn’t what people once meant by droits de l’homme, or now 
mean by “human rights,” then so much the worse for the expectation of a long 
and continuous tradition that led to what turns out to be a very contemporary 
idea and movement. 
 * 
In what follows, the goal is to fix as precisely as possible the chronology 
Maritain’s turn to rights and to piece together basic elements of the larger context 
of the transformation of political Christianity required to explain that turn. 
Contrary to a common misunderstanding, Maritain’s break with his reactionary 
affiliates around Action Française in the late 1920s (precipitated by the Pope’s 
condemnation of the group) did not by itself transform this thinker into a 
supporter of rights. In Maritain’s eyes, it was a matter of saving Maurras’s 
insight from his error: “the truths acknowledged by the criticism of liberal and 
revolution ideology must be delivered in a higher synthesis than the mere 
nationalist idea could ever guarantee,” he wrote in The Things that Are Not 
Caesar’s, justifying his response to the papal ban. “Men in our time are 
summoned to an integral restoration of Christian values, to a universal 
reinvention of order.” In many ways Christianity’s liberation from direct politics 
meant the continuation of an old project in resituated form. Indeed, far from 
being neutral towards the form of government, religion requires us to “procure 
the truly human and therefore moral good of the social body.”4 An intricate path 
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(which I try to cover elsewhere) would lead him from here to his epoch-making 
Integral Humanism (1936) and beyond. The papal ban eventually did lead him to 
attack “political theology,” i.e., the belief that Christianity should seek an 
integralist society in which the line between Church and state would fade away. 
And this led Maritain to some courageous stands in the later 1930s – opposition 
to Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia as a perversion of the humanism its partisans 
claimed they were bringing to savage lands; vituperation of the widespread 
belief that Catholics should rally against republicanism (and communism) in the 
Spanish Civil War as part of a religious crusade; and even principled 
denunciation of Christian and other forms of antisemitism.5 
That Maritain earned attacks as “red” and even “Jewish” as a result of 
these stands against the current of his co-religionists is not surprising. (In 
welcoming him to America, even Catholics there would have to make sure: the 
first three questions posed to him in a Commonweal interview of 1939 inquired 
in order whether he was a Jew, mason, or communist.)6 He was advocating a 
minority view in French (and world) Catholicism. But since it would eventually 
become a majority view, it bears insisting that these stands cannot be separated 
from the positive vision Maritain was developing. If one’s question is why, from 
cause to cause, a vision like Maritain’s would later win over the Church, one 
cannot restrict one’s attention to the cause by itself, for the answer lies in the 
larger reinvented Christian vision on offer.7 That his risky bet paid off means that 
the focus must be just as much on what he wanted to bring about, for the 
“democracy” and “rights” that Maritain’s humanism would shortly come to 
imply could mean many things. Maritain’s bold dissent against the Christian 
right of his time established the kernel of a vision of a different Christian order in 
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whose service he worked, whose point was to provide a plausible alternative to 
secularism east and west, and it was this vision that was to survive its 
competitive 1930s origins by many decades. It is this vision, indeed, that Maritain 
merely updated when he turned to human rights not long after. 
One interesting sign of this is that he freely entered the 1930s competition 
over new order visions, promoting a Catholic entrant, one that eventually would 
take on board human rights. In an outtake from his magnum opus Integral 
Humanism published in English on “the new Christian order to come,” Maritain 
offered a speculative philosophy of history as to how the new reign of spirit he 
advocated might be brought about. Maritain predicted a “historical catastrophe 
of world proportions” following from the crisis of liberalism; and, appealing to 
old millennialist scripts of time, Maritain saw in the coming catastrophe the 
beginning of the celebrated “third age” of the world anticipated by Christian 
philosophers of history since the middle ages. “[T]his third era,” Maritain 
hypothesized, “should begin to appear with the general dissolution of post-
medieval humanism and nobody knows how many centuries it would last after 
that. There is no intention of suggesting, with some millennarist thinkers, that it 
should be a golden age [but o]nly under this order could integral humanism 
blossom to fulness.” It was precisely and only by renouncing the explicit claim to 
governmental power that Christianity could realize the universal civilization that 
was its destiny, and individual Christians, far from accepting a merely interior 
faith because of the failure of theocratic aspirations, had to mobilize. “A full 
dissemination of Christianity in the temporal order is promised at the historical 
period which will follow the dissolution of man-centered humanism,” Maritain 
maintained.8 For a long time, however, indeed late into the 1930s, there was 
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simply no sign in Maritain’s thought that such “Christian humanism” meant 
human rights. 
* 
The central concept that would eventually permit (though not at all 
require) this derivation was that of the “person,” which would eventually 
become the foundational term of the Universal Declaration of 1948. Maritain’s 
first defense of “the person” and its retroactive identification with Thomism 
(Maritain’s philosophical school throughout his career) occurs in his popular 
Action Française era book Three Reformers (1925). The reason this is of interest, 
to start, is that the basic claim of the sociopolitical relevance of “the person” 
antedates Maritain’s break with the far right of his day. The crux of the idea of 
“the person” is its opposition to “the individual.” Maritain not only politicized 
the distinction as he invoked it; he did so in a way that fit his politics at the time. 
“In the social order, the modern city sacrifices the person to the individual; it 
gives universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion, to the individual, and 
delivers the person, isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and 
protect it, to all the devouring powers which threaten the soul’s life, to the 
pitiless actions and reactions of conflicting interests and appetites, to the infinite 
demands of matter to manufacture and use.” Yet because it left the individual 
alone, modernity also, in an apparent paradox, opened the way for a far more 
depraved collectivization than the religious civilization it had somehow caused 
to fall. “If the State is to be built out of this dust of individuals, then … the 
individual will be completely annexed to the social whole.” Capitalism and 
communism were at root the same mistake. Yet it cannot be said in this era that 
Maritain did much more than gesture towards the political significance of 
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personalism. He claimed that the distinction between person and individual 
“contains, in the realm of metaphysical principles, the solution of many social 
problems.” He suggested that the personalist city must be Christian (and vilified 
the secularist reformer Jean-Jacques Rousseau for arrogating God’s sovereignty 
for the people), but that is about it.9 It was left to others, especially the “new 
order” and “non-conformist” intellectuals, and above all Emmanuel Mounier, to 
make the person the touchstone of French social and political thought in the 
1930s. In this first decade of its circulation, however, personalism excluded rights 
as well, and in all of its forms. 
* 
 That is why we must look carefully at the Church and world politics to 
contextualize Maritain’s ideological adventure. “Although in the extraordinary 
conditions of these times the Church usually acquiesces in certain modern 
liberties, she does so not as preferring them in themselves, but as judging it 
expedient to allow them until in happier times she can exercise her own liberty,” 
Pope Leo XIII had written in 1888.10 The move towards the later twentieth 
century embrace of rights talk as the essence of Christian social thought – notably 
in John XXIII’s “Pacem in Terris” as well as in some documents of the Second 
Vatican Council that he called, and then in a different but equally pronounced 
way in the storied papacy of John Paul II – occurred neither at a slow and steady 
pace nor all at once in a single transformative moment. The terms “dignity” and 
“person” are of somewhat older vintage in papal pronouncement than that of 
“rights,” precisely because the former were ambiguous enough to be compatible 
with a wide range of inferred doctrines in different national settings and within 
specific national communities. But the same is true even of the latter, to the point 
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that it also appeared on occasion earlier than the crucial period of the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, first associated with the social question and the “rights of labor” 
(notably in Leo’s own Rerum Novarum and later Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno). 
Nevertheless, these invocations were “neither comprehensive nor tightly 
systematic.”11 
The first period of quickened use, which has not been effectively studied, 
occurred in the antitotalitarian transformation of the Church in the late 1930s, 
which led Pius XI towards the end of his papacy to begin to use the language in a 
more serious and organizing way. The remarkable turn against “statolatry” by 
no means compelled any embrace of rights as an organizing doctrine; but it did 
involve the assertion of religious sovereignty over personal conscience. 
Interestingly, it was most frequently antiliberal premises that led to what may 
seem a liberalizing outcome in this denunciation of the era’s dictators (Benito 
Mussolini usually exempted), with the modern and “secularist” separation of 
state from church often presented as having allowed the menacing totalitarian 
hypertrophy of the state to occur.12 In any event, it was at this moment that Pius – 
who knew Maritain well and esteemed his work – turned directly to personalism 
as the foundation of Church’s spiritual alternative to totalitarianism, in 1937-38. 
“Man, as a person,” Pius declared, “possesses rights that he holds from God and 
which must remain, with regard to the collectivity, beyond the reach of anything 
that would tend to deny them, to abolish them, or to neglect them.”13 This 
phraseology, from the anti-Nazi encyclical of March 1937, Mit brennender Sorge, 
was matched by the anti-communist encyclical of the same month, Divini 
redemptoris, the latter with greater emphasis on the right of property in the 
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context of a more general picture of the rights of the person against the 
totalitarian collective.14 
It was thus in a moment of discovering two extreme political ideologies 
that, in its view, left no room for Christianity that the Church discovered its 
sovereignty over the “human,” over which in turn no merely temporal politics 
can claim full authority. Soon to become Pius XII, Eugenio Pacelli, in summer 
1937, made clear the centrality of this new figure, with “a vast and dangerous 
conspiracy” threatening unlike any prior occasion “the inviolability of the 
human person that, in his sovereign wisdom and dignity, the Creator has 
honored with an incomparable dignity.” Pacelli cited the critical line from Mit 
brennender Sorge to make clear that this inviolable dignity gave rise to some set 
of rights. Of course, personalism meant community not atomism. All the same, 
“if a society believed it could diminish the dignity of the human person in 
refusing it all or some of the rights that come to it from God, it would miss its 
goal.”15 
What such changes in papal political theory meant on the ground, in the 
context of much other doctrine and the inherited weight of tradition, varied 
widely – especially after Pius XII’s election a year later to face the final crisis of 
the 1930s and the difficult choices of the war. With respect to the language of 
rights as well as in other ways, Pius XII, like any good strategist, left his options 
open, encouraging some possible lines of future development and tolerating 
others.16 In different national contexts, rights talk had different fates: the new 
language of the rights of the human person was not just passively received, but 
was creatively interpreted from place to place and moment to moment. As Paul 
Hanebrink has shown in the case of Hungarian debates, for example, what was 
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at stake for some churchmen and Christian politicians was only “the rights of 
(Christian) man,” chiefly the defense of the right of conversion against racist 
essentialism, still in the name of a exclusionary vision of a Christianized nation.17 
But in America – before Maritain ever turned to rights – a small band of liberal 
Catholics chose a different direction. 
In an unremembered but fateful statement to Americans on the jubilee of 
Catholic University, Pius XI had written barely two months before his death that 
“Christian teaching alone gives full meaning to the demands of human rights 
and liberty because it alone gives worth and dignity to human personality.” In a 
pastoral letter, American bishops took the argument a (textually unwarranted) 
step further: “His Holiness calls us to the defense of our democratic government 
in a constitution that safeguards the inalienable rights of man.”18 Historians who 
have examined the crucial early war years to trace the remarkable afflatus of the 
hitherto largely unused (in English) phrase of “human rights” have discovered 
minor percolations but little else until something happened to catapult the term 
into its immediate postwar career. Completely neglected among these 
percolations so far highlighted, however, is the comparatively early Catholic 
articulation of the human rights idea.19 
In 1939 already, in response to the papal turn against totalitarianism and 
his letter insisting on the rights of the person, the prominent liberal Catholic John 
A. Ryan, together with Notre Dame’s Charles Miltner, founded the short-lived 
Committee of Catholics for Human Rights, to oppose the radio priest Charles 
Coughlin and rampant American Catholic racism; and in the early issues of their 
publication, The Voice for Human Rights, they featured Jacques Maritain as a 
key icon and author (even though he had not yet started to use their language).20 
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The organization had originated out of a predecessor group more specifically 
concerned with antisemitism, but the rhetorical shift allowed generalization 
beyond that issue, as in Amarillo bishop Robert Lucey’s ringing complaint in 
1940 that “Millions of citizens throughout the world are no longer considered as 
inviolable persons: they are mere things to be juggled at will by gangster 
governments. … The natural law demands that all human rights be afforded to 
all human beings.”21 And some of the time, Pius XII turned to the rights talk that 
his predecessor had initiated. Already in his widely reported Christmas message 
to the world for 1940, he followed Maritain in calling for a new Christian order, 
and in his Pentecost radio message six months later, he recommended a 
declaration of the rights of the human person as its basis; and as of America’s 
entry into the war in late 1941 American Catholics were alluding to Pius’s peace 
points as implying that the United States should become “the instrument of 
Almighty God” for setting up a “new era” in which “human rights” would offer 
all peoples “prosperity and a chance of the pursuit of happiness.”22 
As the war continued, papal pronouncement remained open-textured 
enough for Catholics to infer widely different messages from it. But one of the 
Catholic bishops who formed a committee to promote the papal peace points in 
this country, Aloyisius Muench of Fargo, North Dakota, entertained the belief – 
at least according to his later testimony – that FDR’s later language of new order 
and four freedoms merely amplified the pope’s call for a postwar political 
settlement based on universal moral principles. This was especially so thanks to 
the 1942 letter FDR wrote to American bishops after the country’s entrance in the 
war that the United Nations would seek “the establishment of an international 
order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and nations.” “We 
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were assured by the late President Roosevelt,” Muench recalled just after the 
conflict, when he had become papal nuncio to defeated Germany, “that the war 
would not be one of vengeance but to establish a new order in the spirit of Christ 
[and] a crusade for the preservation of the rights of men.”23 American Catholics 
were in advance of others, and even their president, in deploying the phrase 
“human rights,” but by 1941-42 Catholics in Germany and France were to be 
using the language too. The nuance and specificity of wartime human rights 
discourse remains to be studied, for the defense of the human rarely meant any 
special concern with the Holocaust and frequently went along with fierce 
Christian anticommunism in which enthusiastic support for Adolf Hitler’s anti-
Bolshevik crusade could coexist with dissent from his depredations against life.24 
Nevertheless, the language is there, as a possible new basis of the Church’s 
political identity, for those who had stopped dreaming the dream of “holy 
empire.” German bishops, in a common pastoral letter of Easter 1942, rose in 
protest of their regime’s trampling not just of the church’s rights (in disregard of 
the earlier concordat) but also of human rights – “the general rights divinely 
guaranteed to men.” The extraordinary clandestine resistance group of French 
Catholics, Témoignage chrétien, republished this letter and amplified the call in 
its summer booklet “Human and Christian Rights.”25 
 Maritain intersected this earlier but episodic, unsystematic and selective 
Catholic tradition of rights and made it his most enduring contribution to the 
twentieth-century church and world. Maritain had already, by the late 1930s, 
begun a geographical and intellectual voyage to the American scene – one that 
would be fateful for the future of Catholicism as a whole. He originally went to 
North America in 1933, when he accepted fellow Thomist Étienne Gilson’s 
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invitation to lecture annually at a new Institute for Medieval Studies in Toronto; 
and he first set foot in the United States in 1938.26 But it was only the war that led 
his Christian humanism in the direction of rights. This is not to say that the 
Catholic rights turn described above did not have an immediate effect: in 
speaking on the Jewish question in 1937-38, Maritain could rise in defense of “a 
pluralism founded on the dignity of the human person, and established on the 
basis of complete equality of civic rights, and effective respect for the liberties of 
the person in his individual life.” The defense, however, immediately had to be 
couched in absolutely clear rejection “the old Liberalism,” even as it was 
“thoroughly opposed to the ignominious medievalist Hitlerian parody.” Rights, 
Maritain emphasized, were only going to be retrievable “in a general new régime 
of civilization, freedom from the ills of capitalistic materialism as well as from 
the even greater ills of Fascism, Racism, and Communism.”27 In any case, far 
from becoming the self-evident entailments of the dignity of the human person 
they would shortly become (let alone the key watchwords of politics), rights 
remained highly uncertain in the place they initially found in Maritain’s thought: 
in a Chicago speech from the same period, Maritain still claimed to his American 
audience, in perfect fidelity to integral humanism, that “democracy can no longer 
afford the luxury of drifting. Individualism in the sense of individual rights and 
comforts must cease to be its chief objective.”28 Fortunately, he continued, there 
were emerging signs that America planned to rediscover the religious 
imperatives of its civilization. In his Théâtre Marigny speech, just after the 
Munich agreements and the year before German tanks rolled into Paris, Maritain 
could lavish praise upon the remarkable State of the Union address that Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt gave for 1939 in which he endorsed religion as the foundation 
 14 
of democracy. (In the same speech, Maritain likewise cited Walter Lippmann 
marveling: “that the President, who is the most influential democratic leader in 
the world, should recognize religion as the source of democracy … is a 
fundamental reorientation in the liberal democratic outlook upon life.”)29 Yet in 
the end it was only the events of the war, together with America’s apparent 
return to its religious basis, and entry into the conflict, that drove Maritain 
unequivocally towards rights. 
 * 
 On his annual visit to North America when France fell, Maritain had to 
stay there, and played a critical role in the organization of émigré intellectual life 
during the following years.30 From the 1930s, there is a large intraphilosophical 
and intratheological literature about the viability of Maritain’s person/individual 
distinction, what it might mean, and why it might matter.31 It would be wrong to 
isolate the doctrine from politics, however. By itself, personalism could have led 
Maritain, like so many other Catholics and para-Catholics, into the arms of the 
Vichy government, whose leader, indeed, himself proclaimed that 
“individualism has nothing in common with respect for the human person” (a 
respect he promised his regime would restore, along with religious civilization). 
Maritain’s formulae of the “primacy of the spiritual” and “integral humanism” 
were even used as sloganeering buzzwords by Vichyite intellectuals and youth.32 
But Maritain, in exile, opposed Vichy uncompromisingly, and soon became an 
inspiration for the Christian resistance, even if he was ambivalent about Charles 
de Gaulle as the Free French leader, on the grounds that the latter would not 
concur with his vision of personalistic democracy.33 
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It was most clearly in early 1942 that Maritain transformed into the 
philosopher of human rights that he had never been before.34 In Natural Law and 
Human Rights, Maritain took what would be a fateful step for postwar 
intellectual history as a whole, making the claim that a revival of natural law 
implies a broad set of prepolitical human rights. What would have been – and 
still is – curious about this claim, of course, is that whatever their opinions of the 
origins of modern rights talk, nearly all histories of the political language concur 
that the rise of rights in political theory occurred after and because of the 
destruction of the Thomistic natural law tradition.35 In either a stroke of a master 
or a sleight of hand, Maritain – as if the Church had not long and unanimously 
rejected modern rights – claimed that the one implied the other and indeed that 
only the one plausibly and palatably justified the other. He did so in the teeth of 
plausible initial skepticism from some of his own most devoted followers, the 
Catholic émigrés Waldemar Gurian and Yves Simon, that Thomism might now 
be unsalvageable due to its votaries’ almost uniformly reactionary political 
choices on the continent. In a now famous remark, Gurian noted: “if Thomas 
were alive today he would be for Franco, for Tizo, for Pétain. … To be practical 
in 1941 with St. Thomas in politics is a joke.” In private, Simon went so far as to 
worry that a generation’s worth of criticism of the French Revolution and its 
rights had, sadly, redounded to the benefit “not of Thomas but of Hitler.”36 
Maritain energetically strove to override this skepticism, so that it is due 
above all to him that what came to be the Catholic position in recent political 
theory came about, with the older view that Catholicism’s political and social 
doctrine could not be reformulated in terms of rights dropped in exchange for 
the claim that only the Catholic vision placing them in the framework of the 
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common good afforded a persuasive theory of rights.37 By his Christmas message 
of 1942, the one frequently discussed solely for its insufficient reference to Jewish 
suffering, Pius too was laying out his postwar vision in terms of the dignity of 
the person and human rights.38 If it is true that Maritain “formulate[d] ideas 
about the dignity of the human person, human freedom, human rights, and 
democracy which were interpreted by critics as an accommodation to the post-
Enlightenment philosophy that he despised,” it was because of Maritain’s 
historically dubious but strategically brilliant gambit to capture an originally 
alien language for Catholicism and claim a perfect and necessary fit. In reality, 
Maritain “retained natural law but redefined its content.”39 All the same, just as 
some Catholics wondered then and since if Maritain conceded too much to 
modernity (“dressing up poor Thomas Aquinas in the rags of a laicist apostle of 
democracy,” in Aurel Kolnai’s hilariously grim assessment), others asked if the 
Catholic theory of modern rights Maritain sought ultimately prioritized the 
avoidance of secularism over the break with integralism: “Maritain has presented 
a plausible and persuasive alternative to both secularism and clericalism,” the 
Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr allowed in his New York Times review 
of the rights book, “but it naturally has the defect of avoiding the errors of the 
former more completely than of the latter.”40 
In the flow of Maritain’s political theory in these years, in fact, the 
Catholic position of the non-individualist person in the non-totalitarian 
community remained stable, as the overall governing framework into which 
rights were introduced. In an atmosphere in which many Catholics understood 
the defense of the West to mean all-out war against Bolshevism even at the price 
of alliance with unholy forces (like the French cardinal who saw the Archangel 
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Michael leading “the old Christian and civilized peoples who defend their past 
and their future at the side of the German armies”), Maritain’s message seems 
often to have been primarily directed against political theology, and against the 
Christian preference for fascism as the lesser evil. “An obscure process of 
leniency toward totalitarian forms that lying propaganda tries to picture as the 
upholders of order,” Maritain regretted at the University of Pennsylvania 
bicentennial in 1940, “has thus invaded parts of the believing groups in many 
countries.”41 “The error of those Catholics who follow Pétain in France or Franco 
in Spain,” Maritain wrote Charles de Gaulle in 1941, “is to convert Catholic 
thought, though lack of social and political education, in the direction of old 
paternalistic conceptions of history rejected in the meantime by the popes and 
condemned by history.”42 “The ideology now being fed to the French in the 
absence of a genuine reconstruction program,” he noted in his widely-noticed 
and clandestinely spread France My Country, “is a bizarre mixture of 
commonplaces, where these borrowed from Catholic social teachings are 
imbedded in the teachings of the political school of total nationalism.”43 
The idea, then, was that Catholic social thinking could be and had to be 
saved from its accidental entanglements with nationalism. What then was 
involved in Maritain’s new defense of rights and democracy? Stuart Hughes 
once observed: “All [Maritain’s] subsequent volumes of polemic and public 
philosophy were footnotes to or expansions on the themes that [Integral] 
Humanism had announced.”44 Given the major change of vocabulary to rights 
talk or democracy that occurred after, it is surprising that this statement only 
needs slight correction. In the first place, Maritain’s attitude towards the 
catastrophe of modernity softened slightly but discernibly (though it never 
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reversed). “The modern world has pursued good things,” Maritain allowed 
already in 1938, “down wrong pathways.”45 Second, while he continued to place 
much stock in parastate charitable action, he did far more graphically come 
down in favor of a specific regime – perhaps in a way that conflicted fragrantly 
with his earlier ban on “political theology.” That Maritain in the late 1930s and 
after advocated a democracy infused by Christianity made his new stance no less 
an endorsement of a non-neutral political theology. Finally, this relative move 
toward an affirmation of a specific kind of state framework within which alone a 
“new Christian order” could come about forced Maritain to quietly but 
decisively drop his old associations of formal liberties and formal democracy 
with liberal individualism on its deathbed. He broke almost completely with 
visions, like either Marxism or Mounier’s personalism, that treated formal rights 
and democracy as elements of a hypocritical capitalist sham. Formal or 
“bourgeois” liberties formerly condemned now had to be resurrected as 
providing the legal carapace of the Christian state and intrastate order. Arguably, 
however, these innovations were in the service of keeping Maritain’s Christian 
vision the same in new circumstances. The goal remained a personalist 
communitarianism, even if that substantive vision prompted a less critical 
attitude towards formal guarantees and political structures or might indeed 
invest them with considerable significance. (One could say something similar of 
Pius XII who, having adopted the rhetoric of the rights of the person, was by his 
1944 Christmas message following Maritain by endorsing democracy on 
condition of differentiating between its Christian communitarian and reprobate 
secularist version.)46 
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It was thus due neither to doctrinal purification nor to institutional 
destiny that Maritain could be led to expound “Christian humanism” and its 
doctrine of rights by early 1942 in Fortune magazine. He still castigated modern 
man for “claim[ing] human rights and dignity – without God, for his ideology 
grounded human rights and human dignity in a godlike, infinite autonomy of 
human will.” But he also now referred to the apparently alternative “concept of, 
and devotion to, the rights of the human person” as “the most significant 
political improvement of modern times.”47 In these years, Maritain reached 
almost manic heights of activity, both authorial and organizational, in his 
participation in the New York and larger American émigré community and in a 
far-flung international network of correspondents and publishers. Notably, in 
late 1941 and early 1942 he was deeply involved in gathering editorial 
suggestions for a manifesto of Catholic intellectuals and putting it in final form, 
expressing the antitotalitarian critique of fascism and the alternative of 
personalist rights that was much noticed.48  But the basis of his activity remained 
largely constant. In the deluge of his remarkable output over period -- from essay 
collections like Scholasticism and Politics to pamphlets like Christianity and 
Democracy and from radio messages to the French people to occasional 
intervention pieces -- Maritain rearticulated personalist communitarianism in the 
language of rights-based democracy. Further, having inventively claimed for 
Catholicism new compatibility with modern democracy and rights, Maritain 
reciprocally credited Catholicism with having been – often behind the backs of 
actual Catholic thinkers and actors – the source of those norms. At the Liberation, 
he offered his political and social philosophy to his French brethren, who he 
thought were finally in a position to see the mutuality of Christianity and 
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democracy that their oppositional history – not least in their own country – had 
obscured.49 
By 1944 the rights of the human person, as galvanized by Maritain’s 
enthusiastic promotion and as the ground of his reappropriation of democracy, 
were understood by activist Catholics to be the main bulwark against Hitlerian 
racism.50 And such Catholics also claimed that the concept provided the key 
slogan for the postwar settlement, which would have be to based on principle 
not power. The answer would be a vision of human rights that split the 
difference, or rather found the proper reconciliation, between self and collective. 
Appealing to Pius XII’s Christmas message of 1942, Richard Pattee explained on 
the radio in 1945, “The genius of Catholicism is perhaps no better illustrated than 
in the subtle and profound harmony that is established between the dignity of 
the human being as a singular person, and the obligations and duties of that 
person as a member of society.”51 As FDR turned by 1944 to supplement his 
promise of four freedoms with a “second bill of rights” ensuring social 
protection, Maritain worked with sociologist Georges Gurvitch to bring the 
originally French tradition of social rights to the attention of the world.52 
 * 
A new paradigm had been forged. Thanks to FDR’s championship of 
them – but also the earlier and continuing cultural factors that historical 
scholarship on wartime and postwar human rights has so far left out – the phrase 
“human rights” gradually entered diplomatic parlance and became a brief slogan 
in international affairs in the period following the Allied victory. There is no 
need here to follow Maritain’s own involvement in this moment, which has been 
studied elsewhere; thanks to its late interwar promotion, ongoing papal 
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pronouncement, Maritain’s strenuous advocacy, and the generally religious 
ambiance of the drafting process, “the person” became a prominent feature of the 
declaration, beginning in the preambular affirmation of “the dignity and worth 
of the human person.”53 It may be true, then, that (as Mark Mazower has argued) 
there was a conceptual shift from group to individual in diplomatic and legal 
circles that set the stage for the post-World War II human rights moment. But 
there was also a shift afoot from the individual to the person, and in terms of its 
cultural meaning at the time, and the embedding of its ideas in postwar 
European politics, the Universal Declaration is a profoundly communitarian 
document -- precisely a moral repudiation of dangerous individualism.54 Indeed, 
in my view this is the key to placing the document more securely in the 
ambiance of the war’s aftermath, as part of the moral reconstruction of Europe 
perceived to be necessary to stave off future world crises and conflicts. 
As Wolfram Kaiser has now shown, Christian Democracy, hegemonic 
starting in this era as the continent restabilized, made a politics of personalism 
and dignity central to its work nationally and construction of Europe 
regionally.55 “In the inter-war period catholicism had been closely linked to 
nationalism and the League of Nations had been presented as being a dangerous 
centre of masonic power,” Richard Vinen observes, in a similar vein. “After 1945, 
this changed. Catholic organizations were enthusiastic proponents of 
international harmony, within the western bloc at least, and Christian Democrat 
parties in all European countries were so intimately linked to European 
integration that some began to feel that Europe was being built under the aegis 
of the ‘catholic international.’”56 It should be noted that Maritain’s high-profile 
turn to democracy did not make him a prominent defender of Christian parties 
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in particular, so that the specific form of this historic convergence is not due to 
his influence.57 And in spite of his premier role in spelling out a Catholic rights 
theory, it would be mistaken, for instance, to posit any real influence of Maritain 
on the evolution German-speaking Catholicism so crucial in this era (a significant 
portion of German Catholics would understand the postwar defense of “the 
West” to provide an alternative to the America Maritain came to love).58 All this 
said, he remains a powerfully illustrative figure, since even in the German case it 
is hard not to notice a concordance between Maritain’s thought and the 
spiritualistic antimaterialism and emphasis on dignitarian personalism – 
including sometimes human rights -- prevalent at the time. As Maria Mitchell 
has emphasized, the spiritualist credo came close to providing the central 
ideological fulcrum of Christian democracy in Germany, and just as in the case of 
the Universal Declaration on which it drew, the Federal Republic Basic Law’s 
opening affirmation of human dignity is probably best to read not just 
retrospectively as a response to the Nazi past but prospectively as an allusion to 
the kind of moral future that would best overcome that past. In any event, it is a 
mistake to think about the “recivilization” of West Germany in the absence of the 
religious ideology that provided its justification and explained the specific, non-
secular, moralized form it was supposed to take.59 That the incipient Cold War 
would soon come to be widely understood in terms of the defense of religion and 
“the West” that the Church’s struggle against communism had already been for 
three decades was no doubt crucial here.60 
In this sense, Maritain’s personal trajectory, and incubation of a Christian 
alternative to integralism and communism based on rights, anticipated and 
assisted the shift of the Church and the continent in a new direction. For the 
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Church, of course, full-scale institutional conversion would await the arrival of 
John XXIII, and most notably his encyclical “Pacem in Terris.” The continent, 
however, moved far earlier in the direction of personalistic rights. I have 
emphasized, though, that this story is as much one of continuity as it is of break: 
the language of human rights in its original time, though certainly a form of 
idealism, was one that succeeded because it restated some core ideological 
commitments in a way that also overcame and corrected for Catholic political 
positions in the interwar period and during the disastrous war – including a 
flirtation with the extreme right or embrace of rightist regimes, occasionally in 
the name of “humanity.” Remarkably, in spite of these entanglements, 
Catholicism as a religion and Christian civilization as an idea managed to emerge 
from the war cleanly. Indeed, among many other factors, the Christian 
Democratic and Cold War promotion of human dignity and rights allowed it 
once again to become – as it did surprisingly quickly – the representative of the 
values of the European West, of putative universal significance for the world, 
and Christianity entered its last European golden age. 
But the very success of this transformation was to lead to an obfuscation 
of the very recent and very contingent circumstances in which the relationship 
between Christian Europe and the idea of human rights had been achieved. In a 
last ditch plea to an overwhelmingly secularized continent shortly before his 
death, John Paul II worried that the very Europe that had come to celebrate 
rights as the core of its identity also seemed poised to cut the last thread binding 
it to the Christianity that had allowed their discovery. If Christian Europe finally 
passed into history – which will happen barring some miracle of new 
evangelization – then the faith in rights that was its precious contribution might 
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slowly evaporate, like a sea whose source has been cut off. After all, John Paul 
said, it was from “the biblical conception of man [that] Europe drew the best of 
its humanistic culture, and, not least, advanced the dignity of the person as the 
subject of inalienable rights.”61 The powerful invention of tradition that could 
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